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DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL INFORMATIONCRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
MEDICAID FRAUD IN NEW MEXICO
ARNOLD PADILLA*

In October of 1977, the Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse
Amendments Act' was passed by the Ninety-fifth Congress. Its purpose is "to strengthen the capability of the Government to detect,
prosecute, and punish fraudulent activities under the medicare and
medicaid programs ...."' Pursuant to this Act, the establishment of

a Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (hereinafter, Unit) in each state was
authorized. New Mexico became the second state in the United
States to establish such a Unit. Investigation by the Unit of providerbased fraud began in May of 1978. One of the first problems encountered was that of the ability of the Unit to gain access to all medical
information necessary to properly pursue an investigation. That
access is the subject of this article.
The crimes which are the subjects of this Unit's investigations
result not only in improper billings to the State, but also in potential
and actual abuses and injuries to patients. It is of paramount importance to insure that medical care provided is of the highest quality
possible. When there exists a reasonable belief that a provider has
engaged in criminal activity, it is in the best interest of the medical
profession in general, as well as that of the State, to protect medical
services recipients by diligently and fairly investigating colorable
complaints. Complaints in the Medicaid area include, but are not
limited to: false billings for services not rendered; multiple billings
for the same services; improper billings for services rendered, but not
covered as allowable under the regulations; overbilling; and overprovision of unnecessary services.
Two basic sources of resistance are encountered by those advocating total accessibility by the Unit to medical records. The first is
based on what is generally referred to as the physician-patient privilege. Not only does that privilege not exist in New Mexico, but the
principle would not apply by virtue of the fact that the investigations
*Member New Mexico Bar and California Bar; J.D. Boalt Hall, University of CaliforniaBerkeley, 1976. Presently Associate, McCallister, Fairfield, Query, Strotz & Stribling, P.A.
Formerly an Assistant Attorney General responsible for drafting initial proposal for New
Mexico's first Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, and a member of the Unit's first staff.
1. P. L. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175.
2. Id.
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are directed at one of the partners involved in the privilege. It is an
established tenet that "[p] rivilege cannot be taken advantage of by
(the] opponent." 3 The second instance is found where third parties
offer resistance to disclosure of evaluation-type information found
most commonly in peer-review committee deliberations. That resistance is not based upon privilege or patient confidentiality concerns,
but rather upon policy considerations directed at preserving the
autonomy and impregnability of peer-group deliberations. The
theory relied upon by the medical profession in this area is that if
such deliberations are not protected from all discovery, then medical
service providers will not agree to submit to such reviews and a
valuable evaluation process would become useless. It is difficult to
comprehend why limited and justified discovery, not by the public,
but by qualified investigative bodies charged also with monitoring
the quality of medical care, should cause medical providers to withdraw support of reportedly beneficial review procedures.
Whatever arguments might be mustered for or against this theory,
it is clear that non-disclosure policies must be supported by law if
they are to be applied in criminal actions. A review of statutes and
case law at state and federal levels fails to reveal the existence of any
law applicable to New Mexico which clearly forecloses the Medicaid
Fraud Control Unit from gaining access to committee deliberations
relating to medical providers.
Adequate protection of personal rights can be found in New Mexico. The criminal law system presently incorporates extensive due
process safeguards which protect the rights of the accused. Recipient
rights are protected by the very nature of these investigations, which
are largely geared toward eliminating the victimization of recipients.
Furthermore, Medicaid recipients agree to unlimited access to their
medical records as a condition of receipt of services under federal
law.
Federal regulations relevant to State Medicaid Agencies, Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO's), and Medicaid
Fraud Control Units contain ambiguous and seemingly conflicting
guidelines regarding confidentiality of information. Although access
to certain types of information in the possession of PSRO's is denied
to State Medicaid Agencies, it is not clear that these restrictions
should or presently do apply to independently empowered Medicaid
Fraud Control Units. Resolution of this issue has been delegated by
law to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Recent guidelines, although not as lucid as might be desired, appear to leave little
3. Annot., 2 A.L.R. 2d 645-66 (1948) at Later Case Service § 10, 211 (1971).
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question that Unit access to PSRO records is to be virtually unlimited. Essentially, there presently appears to exist no concrete
restriction as to discovery of medical records including committee
reports by a Medicaid Fraud Unit in New Mexico, aside from the
Constitutional due process safeguards which apply in any criminal
prosecution.
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
In order to properly develop a criminal case in the Medicaid area,
it is necessary for a Unit to gain access to all medical records which
relate to the subject of the complaint being investigated. Procedurally-oriented complaints such as double billings and forgeries, as well
as non-procedural complaints, such as the medical necessity of an
operation, require detailed investigative analyses of medical records
in order to determine whether or not relevant services were received
as billed. The immediate resistance encountered when medical records are requested by the Unit is manifested by the person in possession of such records. The resistance is usually grounded in ethical and
professional principles which question the requestor's right to sensitive information regarding patients. Medical personnel commonly
rely upon the existence of a physician-patient privilege which protects confidential communications from disclosure.
A confidential communication is information which is transmitted
to a lawyer, physician, nurse or clergyman in confidence of the
relation between him or her and the party making it, and under
circumstances which imply that it shall remain undisclosed by the
confidant. The communication may be the result of examination,
treatment, observation or conversation relating to the confider ...
The physician has a clear obligation to keep secret any information
relating to a patient's illness which he obtains during the performance of his professional duties, unless the patient authorizes disclosure of the information or a competent court orders him to reveal
it. This obligation is based first, on the ethics of4the profession and
second, upon legislative enactment in most states.
At common law, no physician-patient privilege existed. "[A]
physician called as a witness had no right to decline or refuse to
disclose any information on the ground that it had been communicated to him confidentially in the course of his attendance upon or
treatment of his patient in a professional capacity." s To overcome
the effect of the common law, a relevant statute must apply because
4. E. Hayt and J. Hayt, Legal Aspects of Medical Records 73 (1964).
5. Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 1458, 1459 (1966).
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the "legal relationship of privilege, as distinguished from the ethical,
exists only by statute and is subject to change by the state legislatures."'6 The New Mexico legislature has explicitly adopted the common law in criminal cases when no statute applies. 7 In New Mexico,
no statute on physician-patient privilege exists, although strict restrictions do exist as to disclosures of information relating to mental
health clients.' As for non-psychiatric situations, not only does a
physician-patient privilege statute not presently exist, but the absence of such a statute is the result of affirmative action taken by the
New Mexico State Legislature in 1973. At that time the New Mexico
legislature eliminated the then existing, albeit limited, physicianpatient privilege. 9 Even in states where physician-patient privilege
statutes do exist "[t] he privileged communications doctrine generally is not available in criminal cases. . . . The rule of privileged

communications was not intended to shield the one charged with an
unlawful act." '1
A number of states have, pursuant to existing statutes, developed
case law explicitly asserting that no physician-patient privilege in
criminal cases exists.' 1 A corollary of this effect can be seen in an
Idaho case, where although a statute conferring a physician-patient
privilege in civil cases did exist, the court found that application of
the common law in a criminal case resulted in no privilege.' 2
A Unit can avoid the issue of the existence of the physicianpatient privilege if a release of medical information can be obtained
from the patient. There is no legal requirement that the release authori6. E. Hayt and J. Hayt, supra note 4, at 75.
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-1-3 (1978) states that "In criminal cases where no provision of
this code is applicable, the common law, as recognized by the United States and the several
states of the Union, shall govern."
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-19 (1978):
Disclosureof Information.
A. Except as otherwise provided in this code, [43-1-2 to 43-1-23 NMSA
19781, no person shall, without the authorization of the client, disclose or
transmit any confidential information from which a person well acquainted
with the client might recognize such client as the described person, or any
code, number or other means which can be used to match the client with
confidential information regarding him.... F. Information concerning a client
disclosed under this section shall not be released to any other person, agency
or government entity, nor placed in fides or computerized data banks accessible to any other person.
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12 (Supp. 1975).
10. Hayt, Hayt, and Groeschel, Law of Hospital, Physician and Patient 1072 (3d Ed.
1972), citing Hauck v. State, 148 Ind. 238 (1897).
11. State v. Campbell, 210 Kan. 265, 500 P.2d 21 (1972); State v. Campbell, 146 Mont.
251, 405 P.2d 978, 22 A.L.R. 3d 824 (1965); People v. Combes, 56 Cal. 135, 363 P.2d 4,
14 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1961).
12. State v. Coburn, 82 Idaho 437, 354 P.2d 751 (1960).
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zation by the patient be witnessed by either a notary public or by any
other person. 1 3 Furthermore, much information in the possession of
medical personnel can be obtained without a release.
No authorization from a patient is necessary to disclose ordinary
facts unrelated to treatment, such as the name of the attending
physician, number of times and dates upon which the physician
attended a patient, the name, age and address of the patient on
admission, that the patient was ill and was operated upon, admission
and discharge dates, names of relatives or friends given upon admission, whether the patient was sick, date of birth
14 of a patient's child,
and other facts which are obvious to anyone.

The New Mexico Unit, therefore should consider itself unhindered
in its investigations by the existence of any physician-patient privilege. In other states, where such legislatively enacted privileges do
exist, legal means may nevertheless be available to allow such discovery in criminal actions.
COMMITTEE REPORTS AND DELIBERATIONS-PEER REVIEW
IN NEW MEXICO

In hospital settings, different committees exist, by historical practice and by federal mandate, which review and pass judgment on
various aspects of physician performance. In New Mexico, records of
providers of medical services for the Medicaid program are extensively reviewed by the PSRO' I by contract with the New Mexico
13. E. Hayt and J. Hayt, supra note 4, at 87.
14. Id. at 93.
15. A brief description of PSRO functions is found in the CCH Medicare and Medicaid
Guide, 12,855:
In the light of shortcomings believed to exist in the utilization review process (see 12,695, et seq.), the Social Security Amendments of 1972 (P.L.
92-603) added provisions to the Social Security Act that provide a review
mechanism through which practicing physicians will assume full responsibility
for reviewing the utilization of services. Under these provisions, the Secretary
is required to establish independent Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO's), consisting of substantial numbers of practicing physicians
(usually 300 or more) in local areas to assume responsibility for comprehensive and on-going review of services covered under the Medicare, Medicaid, and
Maternal and Child Health Care programs ( 12,860).
The purpose of these organizations, as stated in the law, is to promote the
effective, efficient, and economical delivery of health care services of proper
quality for which payment may be made ... under the Act. The PSRO will be
responsible ( 12,865) for assuring that payments for health care services
under these programs will be made: (1) only when medically necessary, as
determined in the exercise of reasonable limits of professional discretion; and
(2) in the case of inpatient services, only when and for such period as such
services cannot, consistent with professionally recognized health care standards, effectively be provided on an outpatient bases or more economically in
an inpatient health care facility of a different type.
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Department of Human Services. The PSRO reviews both hospital and
ambulatory care. The reviews are conducted by the professional
peers of the provider being reviewed. For many hospitals participating in New Mexico's Medicaid program, PSRO has, under permissible program parameters, delegated its Medicaid review functions to
extant Utilization Review Committees within the institutions.
Committee reports and deliberations contain information which
differs from that contained in a patient's formal medical record.
Tissue committees, for example, study and report to the medical
staff on the differences between preoperative diagnoses and postoperative reports by pathologists on tissue removed during an operation. Tissue committee reports:
[D] o not constitute a recognized part of the patient's clinical record, which is divided into three sections: (1) nurse's record, (2)
records and reports from adjunct and special departments and (3)
the medical report proper, which is the direct responsibility of the
physician. As such, the tissue committee reports have no bearing on

what was wrong with the patient or what treatment should have
been provided. It is rather a review of what was done for the patient,

made after he has left the hospital, to evaluate the care which he
received. 16
The significance to Medicaid fraud investigations of the aboveexampled committee report lies in the fact that a physician's performance has undergone an overall evaluation by his peers, as well as in
relation to specific cases. These reports are not normally accessible to
non-hospital personnel, but do bear upon the quality of care provided by, and necessity of procedures utilized by, specific providers
who may be targets of investigation.
One peculiarly medical defense which will be raised by defendantproviders, in response to accusations of utilization of improper or
unnecessary procedures will be an assertion that the procedure was,
in the reasonable opinion of the physician, "medically necessary" at
the time of its implementation. Such a defense, since a determination
of "medical necessity" relies so heavily upon amorphous and often
ill-defined professional standards, will under normal circumstances be
difficult to overcome. To determine the existence of "medical necessity," recourse to professional practice norms must be had. When this
occurs, it will be likely that the standards applied by PSRO will be
deemed relevant. This would be especially true of the content of any
peer review deliberation held at PSRO in regard to procedures utilized by the physician in question.1 7
16. E. Hayt and J. Hayt, supra note 4, at 151.

17. See Heilburn, The Professional Standards Review Organization:Its Impact on Medi-

cal Litigation, Utah L. Rev. 433, at 439-42 (1975).
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As a criminal defendant, the physician will be afforded virtually
unlimited discovery prerogatives by the courts and can be expected
to be provided complete access to committee reports. Consequently,
it would serve no purpose to deny such information to the prosecution unit. Furthermore, an important element in establishing a crime
is willfulness. If a physician's record has been reviewed by PSRO, and
if that physician has been criticized for utilizing improper procedures, yet continues his activities in spite of such knowledge, then
such information is important evidence in establishing that the requisite intent for the commission of the crime existed.
Groups such as PSRO, which are charged with peer review responsibilities, generally express some concern that the confidentiality of
their records and deliberations will be breached via court discovery
processes. The issue of patient protection, and of protection against
suits by patients for breach of confidentiality, is met in the application of the following principle:
In states which have no privileged communications statute, a physician may disclose confidential information with the proper circumstances, as when third parties, such as insurance companies, have an
interest in the subject matter, and the information is given in good
faith, with reason to believe that these communications are true, and
without malice toward the person affected. The public authorities,
right to
and particularly those enforcing the criminal law, have the
18
such information if it pertains to a bona fide investigation.
The remaining and primary concern appears to be that such records
will be used against physicians, hospital staffs, or review committees
in civil litigation such as a malpractice, defamation or negligence suit.
As noted in this article excerpt:
The issue of discoverability (accessibility) of hospital committee proceedings and reports is usually presented in the context of medical malpractice litigation. Hospital committee records that reflect upon the quality of a physician's professional performance obviously are tempting to the
malpractice attorney; they may serve as a source of potential expert witnesses for the plaintiff, or may contain admissions by the defendant. There
is a concern that reports of such committees as credentials or utilization
review may be subject to pretrial discovery and thereby serve as a source
of information to be used against the physician or hospital in litigation.
But curtailing the candid deliberations of these committees because of a
fear of the discovery process could eventually lead to the destruction of the
benefits of committee review.' 9
18. Hayt, Hayt, and Groeschel, supra note 10, at 1968.
19. Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Status, 1 Am. J. of
L. and Med. 245, 266 (1975).
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In New Mexico, however, extensive protection from civil suit
against both complainants and peer review committee members is
found in the decision of Franklin v. Blank.2 0 In that case, the court
found that professional societies exercising peer review were engaged
in protected quasijudicial behavior. Since communications used in
initiating and processing peer review were indispensable to the
process, the court found that they also were absolutely exempt from
use against the potential defendant in any civil action. 2 1 Further, a
law currently in effect in New Mexico, entitled, Health InformationConfidentiality-Immunity from Liability for Furnishing,states that
a custodian of confidential medical information may not only furnish such information upon request to a government agency or its
agent, but is immune from suit for having done so. 2 2 Similarly,
federal law specificially provides even more extensive protection for
complainants and committee members involved in the PSRO review
process. 2 '
The above-noted state and federal protections essentially eliminate
an important line of resistance which might be taken by peer review
20. Franklin v. Blank, 86 N.M. 585, 525 P.2d 945 (Ct. App. 1974).
21. Id.
22. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-1 (1978):
A custodian of information classified as confidential in Subsection A may
furnish the information upon request to a governmental agency or its agent, a
state educational institution, a duly organized state or county association of
licensed physicians or dentists, a licensed health facility or staff committees of
such facilities, and the custodian furnishing the information shall not be liable
for damages to any person for having furnished the information.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6 (1976):
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person providing information to any Professional Standards Review Organization or to any Statewide
Professional Standard Review Council shall be held, by reason of having provided such information, to have violated any criminal law, or to be civilly
liable under any law, of the United States or of any State (or political subdivison thereof) unless(1) such information is unrelated to the performance of the duties and
functions of such organization or such Council, or
(2) such information is false and the person providing such information
knew, or had reason to believe, that such information was false.
(b) (1) No individual who, as a member or employee of any Professional
Standards Review Organization or of any Statewide Professional Standards
Review Council or who furnishes professional counsel or services to such
Organization or Council, shall be held by reason of the performance by him of
any duty, function, or activity authorized or required of Professional Standards Review Organizations or of Statewide Professional Standards Review
Councils under this part, to have violated any criminal law, or to be civilly
liable under any law, of the United States or of any State (or political subdivision thereof) provided he has exercised due care.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to any
action taken by any individual if such individuals, in taking such actions,
was motivated by malice toward any person affected by such action.
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organizations such as PSRO. 2 4 By law, they are immune from suit
when properly exercising their duties and need not, therefore, fear
civil actions, by patients or by participating providers, when required
to provide committee information to appropriate government agencies, such .as the Unit.
There does exist a small amount of case law relating to the denial
of discovery of committee reports.' ' In instances where committee
reports and deliberations have been denied to parties in a suit, the
rationale presented for such denial by the courts has by and large
been related to the existence within the state of a physician-patient
privilege, and the infringement upon information affecting other
nonplaintiff patients who have not provided disclosure authoriza24. It is interesting to note that just before this article was submitted for publication, the
34th Legislature of New Mexico passed a bill of potentially substantial impact in this area of
disclosure, as relates to Professional Standards Review Organizations. 1979 N.M. Laws ch.
169, entitled, An Act Relating to Health Care Review; Providing a Penalty, has the practical
effect of not only providing immunity from civil suit for members of peer-review committees, and for complainants providing information to such committees but, more importantly, this law makes all information in the possession of PSROs strictly confidential as
against all inquiries and furthermore provides criminal sanctions against disclosure of such
information. Two observations immediately come to mind in reviewing this law. The first is
that this law, although theoretically applicable to all medical peer-review organizations in
New Mexico, is practically speaking, applicable primarily to New Mexico PSRO, and offers
greatest protection to that organization. In light of other information available in this article
pointing up the medical profession's discomfort at disclosure developments, it should not be
a surprise to anyone that physician-oriented PSROs are attempting to fill the breaches in
their disclosure defenses. The second observation is that this attempt must fail, since it is
well established that federal law prohibits any attempts by the States to legislate in an area
which Congress has clearly already pre-empted, as it has here. This relates both to deliberation protections and to disclosure prohibitions, which are addressed in the MedicareMedicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments Act. Furthermore, New Mexico has already,
by case law, supported the protections explicitly provided for in Federal regulation, in the
area of peer-review participation. Franklin v. Blank, 86 N.M. 585, 525 P.2d 945 (Ct. App.
1974). The reasons behind the introduction of this bill, therefore, are open to speculation.
It cannot, however, ultimately hurt a peer-review organization to possess the presumption of
legality in refusing disclosure of information, thereby placing the costly and time-consuming
burden of proof upon the shoulders of those rightfully seeking access to that information.
It is further interesting to note that although the Unit was aware of the existence of this
bill prior to its submission, that knowledge had no perceptible effect upon its passage. This
is due, at least in part, to the fact that the Unit was not consulted by the sponsors of the bill
prior to its submission, even though the Medicaid unit of the Human Services Department
was. That department, in turn, issued approval of the language of the bill without consulting
with the Unit, although communication between the New Mexico Human Services Department and the Unit in such matters is clearly mandated in the Medicaid laws. This points out,
purely as a side comment, the tremendous importance of diligent attention to, and aggressive involvement by the Unit in, passage of legislation. Add to this observations made by
Units and proto-Units throughout the country regarding hostility and non-cooperation directed from older, established, physician-oriented State Medicaid agencies toward nascent
Units, and a picture of quite a complex battleground situation emerges.
25. A similar review of the case law, although in a slightly different context, can-be
found in Springer, Professional Standards Review Organization: Some Problems of Confidentiality, Utah L. Rev. 361 (1975).
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tions.2 6 Even in states where the privilege does exist, however, if the
records sought do not contain information relating to other patients,
it would appear that the information cannot be withheld.2 7 Case law
in this specific area appears to be generally determined by whether or
not a state has one or both of two statutes-a physician-patient privilege statute, and one adopted to partially or entirely forbid the use
of committee reports.
In the federal arena, the law on this point is somewhat unclear. In
a leading case, Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital, Inc.,2 8 in which the
court held that minutes and reports of committee meetings were not
subject to discovery absent a showing of exceptional necessity. This
policy was eroded in Gilman v. United States,2 9 where the court
allowed discovery of the statements of hospital personnel given to a
board of inquiry. 3 0
Various state courts have found that records pertaining to a physician's work could not be discovered. This decision sometimes has
been based on the fact that the records contained privileged information on other patients. 31 Another reason for denying the discoverability of records is the existence of a specific state statute prohibiting disclosure of "proceedings, minutes, records, and reports of such
committees, together with all communications originating in such
committees.... 3 2 Other courts have decided that tissue and executive committee reports were not discoverable under state law, but
that hospital administration records were discoverable.1 3 Other
courts have been more liberal in holding that hospital reports prepared by members of the medical staff relating to the professional
activities of other staff physicians were subject to discovery, 3 4 and
in stating that broad latitude should be accorded pre-trial discovery
in order to properly facilitate preparation of the case. 35
26. See generally, E. Hayt and J. Hayt, supra note 4; Hayt, Hayt and Groeschel, supra
note 10; Judd v. Park Avenue Hosp., 37 Misc. 2d 614, 235 N.Y.S. 2d 843 (Sup. Ct.),aff'd,
18 A.D.2d 766, 235 N.Y.S. 2d 1023 (1962).
27. Young v. King, 136 N.J. Super. 127, 344 A.2d 792 (1975).
28. Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970) affl'd, 479 F.2d 920
(D.C. 1973).
29. Gilman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
30. Id The court followed Bredice in part in denying access to the report written by the
board.
31. Judd v. Park Avenue Hosp., 37 Misc. 2d 614, 235 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct.),aff'd, 18
A.D.2d 766, 235 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1962).
32. Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 191 Neb. 224,
-,
214 N.W.2d 490,
492 (1974).
33. Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App.3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974).
34. Nazareth Literary and Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d 177 (Ky. Ct. App.
1973). These included internal reports from hospital medical staff committees, and related
to the professional competence of the physician.
35. Gureghian v. Hackensack Hospital, 109 N.J. Super. 143, 262 A.2d 440 (Super. Ct. L.
Div. 1970).
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It is interesting to note the results reached in California prior to its
passage of the non-discovery statute. In Kenney v. Superior Court in
and for the County of Yolo, 3 6 the patient-plaintiff was permitted to
discover hospital records relating to disciplinary proceedings concerning the doctor-defendant. The court stated in regard to committee
records that:
Records of disciplinary proceedings, or of the status of a doctor on a

hospital staff, or of his removal therefrom, may or may not be
admissible in evidence. Even if inadmissible, such records may very
well point the way to evidence admissible in a medical malpractice
action . ..

After the passage of a non-discovery statute, a California court found
that the tissue and executive committee reports were not discover3
able but that the hospital administration records were.
If the reasoning found in the above cases are applied to the existing law in New Mexico, it is clear that liberal discovery of such
records is indicated. New Mexico does not have a nondiscovery statute which could be relied upon as a basis to deny discovery. This
state does not recognize the existence of a physician-patient privilege. The cases which denied discovery on other grounds are those
which support extensive discovery, with the exception of Bedrice,
which relied on public policy considerations which were subsequently liberalized by the Gilman case. Since New Mexico has determined that special confidentiality protection in physician-patient
relations is unnecessary, the logical policy extension would appear to
support a similar absence of discovery restrictions relating to professional evaluations and peer review. This position is supported by the
fact that although many states have seen fit to insure non-discoverability of such information by passing a specialized statute, New
Mexico has not. As discussed earlier, New Mexico has implicitly
decided to extend civil suit protection to parties who find themselves
legally compelled to disclose confidential information."
FEDERAL REGULATIONS RELATING TO PSRO

Since the creation of the PSRO's it has been widely recognized
that the laws and regulations in this area which relate to confidentiality of records have been almost hopelessly ambiguous. As related
in a law review article:
36.
37.
38.
39.

Kenney v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App. 2d 106, 63 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1967).
Id at -, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974).
Franklin v. Blank, 86 N.M. 585, 525 P.2d 945 (Ct. App. 1974). See also, supra note
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The federal legislation which creates PSRO and defines its scope and
functions is yet another experiment in cost containment which has
not been sufficiently tested. The legislation, as it stands, raises
important legal and practical problems, and creates profound ambiguities which must be analyzed and clarified. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the provisions of the law governing confidentiality.
In addition, the sometimes secretive manner in which the PSRO law
has been implemented by promulgations and pronouncements without sufficient prior comment and critical analysis, should give everyone pause. When the PSRO regulations are promulgated, the problems arising under this new system of peer review will hopefully be
can
resolved so that patients, health care providers, and practitioners
40
reap the benefits promised by the proponents of the law.

The basic records requirement for persons or institutions providing
services under the State Medicaid Plan 4 1 is qualified by the specific
to
directive contained in another section, in which data disclosure
4
2
delineated.
is
PSRO
as
known
institution
the
by
State
the
40. Springer, Professional Standards Review Organization: Some Problems of Confidentiality, Utah L. Rev. 361, 379-80 (1975).
41. 42 C.F.R. 450.21 (1977):
A State plan for medical assistance under Title XIX of the Social Security Act
must provide for agreements with every person or institution providing services under the State plan under which such person or institution agrees: (a)
To keep such records as are necessary fully to disclose the extent of the
services provided to individuals receiving assistance under the State plan, and
(b) To furnish the State agency (or the Secretary) with such information,
regarding any payments claimed by such person or institution for providing
services under the State plan, as the State agency (or the Secretary) may from
time to time request.
42. 42 U.S.C. 1320 c-15 (1976 Supp. I):
(a)... Any data or information acquired by any Professional Standards Review Organization, in the exercise of its duties and functions, shall be held in
confidence and shall not be disclosed to any person except (1) to the extent
that may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this part, (2) in such cases
and under such circumstances as the Secretary shall by regulations provide to
assure adequate protection of the rights and interests of patients, health care
practitioners, or providers of health care, or (3) in accordance with subsection
(b) of this section.
(b) ... A Professional Standards Review Organization shall provide, in accordance with procedures established by the Secretary, data and information (1)
to assist Federal and State agencies recognized by the Secretary as having
responsibility for identifying and investigating cases or patterns of fraud or
abuse, which data and information shall be provided by such organization to
such agencies at the request of such agencies at the discretion of such Organization on the basis of its findings with respect to evidence of fraud or abuse.
(d) .. No patient record in the possession of a Professional Standards Review
Organization, a Statewide Professional Standards Review Council, or the
Nation Professional Standards Review Council, shall be subject to subpena
[sic] or discovery proceedings in a civil action ....
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None of the language of those sections, however, clearly spells out
the rights of a Unit to information in possession of a PSRO, although
it is indisputable that confidential information may under no circumstances be demanded of a PSRO for use in civil litigation. Subsection
(b) of Section 1166 muddies these waters even more in its assertion
that the "Organization" (PSRO) may provide information to agencies investigating fraud and abuse upon their request, but at its discretion. 4 ' One might interpret this phrase to indicate that PSRO has
total control of the release of confidential information, even in criminal cases. A more accurate reading of this language, however, is
derived by noting the last few words of that sentence in particular,
and by reviewing the role of PSRO in referring cases for investigation. PSRO is charged with the responsibility of referring potential
fraud and abuse cases to the appropriate state agency. 4 a It is in this
context that the clause, "provide ... data and information . . . at the
discretion of such Organization on the basis of its findings with
respect to evidence of fraud and abuse . . ." makes the most sense.
This section can be read to confer discretion upon PSRO to make
referrals based solely on its judgment of the possibility of fraud as
derived from the information available to it. The discretion does not
extend to the appropriateness of information available to the Unit
where a case has already been opened for investigation.
The Secretary of DHEW is empowered to promulgate regulations
specifying the conditions under which confidential information may
be released. 4 s Unfortunately, a void exists in this area for guidelines
relating to PSROs and Units. Such is not the case as between Units
and the State Medicaid Agencies, however:
In a State with a State Medicaid Fraud Control Unit established and
certified under Section 450.3 10, . . . the State agency will:
(i) Refer all cases of suspected fraud to the Unit.
(ii) Comply promptly with a request from the Unit for access to,
and free copies of, any records of information in the possession
of the Medicaid Agency or its contractors if the Unit determines that it may be useful in carrying out its responsibilities
under this section.
(iii) Comply promptly, and without charge, with a request from the
Unit for computerized data stored by the Medicaid agency or
its contractors in such form as the Unit may request, if the Unit
43. Id
44. This requirement is reiterated most recently in proposed regulations reported in
[1978 Transfer Binder] Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) T29,237, at §474.3 and
§474.10(e)(2).
45. 42 U.S.C. 1320c-15 (1976 Supp. I).
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determines that this data may be useful in carrying out its
responsibilities ... 46

It would appear from (ii) and (iii) that the Unit is being encouraged
in its investigations by being granted as complete access to Medicaid
records as is possible. This conclusion is supported by another guideline, which reiterates that a fraud-control program can only be effective through full cooperation involving full access to information,
and which conditions the existence of the Unit upon the availability
of such records. 4
At first glance, it would appear from the regulations that the Unit
is to have a free hand in acquiring all data relevant to its investigations. That impression, however, is contradicted if one accepts the
assumption that the Unit's access to PSRO data will be channeled
strictly through the Medicaid Agency. A PSRO action transmittal
provides clarification as to the limited data access available to the
State Medicaid Agency:
Based on the legislative change of P.L. 95-142, PSRO's are now
required to provide information, upon request, to the state Medicaid
agency if the disclosure is authorized by the Secretary or if the

information is submitted by the PSRO to the Secretary routinely on
a periodic basis. It is the Department's intent to assure that the
information PSRO's are authorized to disclose will be limited to that

appropriate to state/PSRO interrelationships. Information applicable
only to PSRO review, e.g., medical care evaluation studies, personnel
management information, or health care practitioner profiles utilithis limitation and
zing the entire PSRO data base does not meet
4 8
may not be shared with the Medicaid Agency.

Furthermore, the Secretary has provided specifications for the development of additional regulations. 4 9 Extracting the Policy State46. 42 C.F.R. 450.80(a)(8).
47. Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) 21,830, Preamble to Ref §450.8(a)(8) and
(d). .. Supplementary Information ...
... 3. Cooperation Between The Unit and The Medical Agency. -It is evident
that a comprehensive, effective fraud-control program can be achieved only
through close cooperation between the Fraud Control Unit and the Medicaid
Agency. The Unit must have access to information in the possession of or
available to the Medicaid Agency. A Unit may not qualify unless the state
permits access by the Unit to medical records of Medicaid patients, in order to
determine the extent of the care provided. These records must be made available regardless of whether the patient or any other person consent. In amendments to existing regulations (42 C.F.R. 450.21) made necessary by Sec. 9 of
Pub. L. 95-142, the Secretary will consider making direct access by a Unit to
patient records a condition of participation by providers.
48. PSRO Action Transmittal No. 67, March 21, 1978. [1978 Transfer Binder] Medicare
and Medicaid Guide (CCH) 28, 924.
49. Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) 12,882.12, PSRO Action Transmittal No. 16,
as amended by PSRO Action Transmittal No. 41.
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ments which appear to be most relevant to this discussion, it would
appear that PSRO data, sanction reports and deliberations are not
subject to subpoena or discovery in civil actions, nor can PSRO
records be "physically removed from and/or [be] made available or
transmitted outside the custody of the PSRO." 5 0
The Secretary has provided some needed clarification on PSROs.
A "draft transmittal" was distributed by the Director of that office
for review and comment by PSROs throughout the country, in July
of 1978.1 1 At page two of the draft, the disclosure problem is summarized as follows:
The Congress recognized that the confidentiality provisions (section
1166 of the Social Security Act, as enacted in P.L. 92-603), had
been perceived as preventing the disclosure of information on fraud
or abuse by a PSRO. To remedy this problem, Congress enacted
section 1166 (b)(1) to specifically permit disclosure of fraud and
abuse information when an agency requests it. Moreover, under section 1166(a)(1), the assistance of agencies recognized by the Secretary as having responsibility for the identification and investigation
of fraud or abuse in the Medicaid or Medicare programs is a "purpose of this part" for which disclosures may be made without the
necessity for a request from an agency or for regulations specifically
authorizing this disclosure. To protect the confidentiality of the data
and information the Act also provides that it can be released only
to: 1) Federal or State agencies recognized by the Secretary as
having responsibility for identifying and investigating fraud or abuse
of the Medicare or Medicaid programs, and 2) that the agency receiving such information may not redisclose it, unless such redisclosure is made in a judicial, administrative, or other formal legal
proceeding resulting from the investigation. Failure to adhere to this
50. Id.:

17. Disclosure: civil litigation-Subject to regulations governing administrative hearings under Section 205(b) of the Social Security Act, privileged data
and information, PSRO sanction reports and PSRO deliberations shall not be
subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings in any civil action; nor shall any
PSRO member, employee or consultant be subject to subpoena or discovery
proceedings for the purpose of obtaining information relating torthe above.

18. Disclosure: claims appeals.-In claims appeals disclosure of privileged data
for information to other than the claimant or his representative must be
limited to those parties involved in the appeals process.
19. Disclosure: PSRO deliberations-PSRO deliberations concerning patients,
practitioners and facilities which serve as a basis of PSRO decisions shall not
be disclosed outside the PSRO except to federal program assessment personnel
conducting on-site visits to the PSRO. The record of PSRO deliberations may
not be physically removed from and/or made available or transmitted outside
the custody of the PSRO.
51. Letter from Michael J. Goran, M.D., Director of the Office of Professional Standards
Review Organizations, H.E.W., to: Planning and Conditionsal PSROs; Statewide Councils;
Regional PSRO Project Officers (July 26, 1978).
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restriction on redisclosure may subject the individuals involved to
civil or criminal penalties.
The clearest explication of the draft's contents is found in Section
XI of the transmittal, where it is stated that there exist three critical
requirements which must be satisfied before a PSRO is compelled to
release information in its possession: 1) the requesting agency must
be recognized by the Secretary as an appropriate Medicaid fraud and
abuse agency, 2) the agency must be conducting an investigation
relating to its request, and 3) there must be a determination by
PSRO that the requested information is relevant to a determination
of fraud or abuse. The first two requirements present no problems,
since the Unit is recognized by the Secretary as New Mexico's Medicaid Fraud and Control Unit, and since verification of the Unit engaging in an appropriate investigation is merely a factual determination. The third requirement, however, involves a judgment call by
PSRO as to whether or not the information request is "relevant."
Fortunately, the draft contains clarification of what may or may not
be relevant. In the draft, it is pointed out that "Only information
that the PSRO has determined is relevant to an ongoing investigation
of possible fraud or abuse may be provided." Definitions are then
provided:
Generally, the concept of fraud is one of misrepresentation of material facts related to Medicare or Medicaid billing. The most common
type of fraud is the billing for services not rendered. . . . Abuse, on

the other hand, generally concerns a determination that either excessive, inappropriate, harmful or poor quality health care has been
provided to patients by a particular practitioner or provider. The

most common type of abuse appears to be the provision and subsequent billing for excessive and unnecessary care.
The draft goes on to define relevancy, in the context of these investigations, in such a fashion as to make virtually all PSRO information
related to the subject being investigated by the Unit available to the
Unit upon request, and5 upon a minimal factual satisfaction of the
disclosure requirements. 2
52. Id:
This finding is not limited to potential abuses that could result in a PSRO
sanction report, but would encompass all indications of fraud or abuse of the
Medicare or Medicaid programs.
Additionally, this is not a finding that such information would be determinative of fraud or abuse, but merely that it may be relevant to such a determination of fraud or abuse if it would cause the PSRO to have reason to
believe a fraudulent or abusive act had or had not occurred.
The Act permits the PSRO to provide recognized agencies with relevant information of possible fraud or abuse.

Summer 19791

DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL INFORMA TION

It is possible, in view of PSROs consistent past stance in denying
access to their information, that PSRO will attempt to resurrect the
old issue of "discretion" as found in Section 1166. The language of
this draft, however, is explicit enough to turn the "discretion" given
to PSRO into a simple check-off procedure. It still remains for the
draft to be formalized,' ' but in the July 26, 1978 cover-letter to the
draft, written by the Director of OPSRO, PSROs are instructed that
"The procedure set forth in this transmittal should be used immediately, without waiting for the end of the comment period, to determine if the provision of data or information for fraud and abuse in a
particular situation is appropriate under the Act, as now amended." I
As the situation stands, it is clear that the Medicaid Agency may
have information only as specified above. The Unit, however, is not
the Medicaid Agency and is engaged in activities which are substantially different from those undertaken by the Medicaid Agency,
which is primarily interested in program management. Consequently,
the rationale behind restricting data access by the Medical Agency
may not apply to the Unit. Logically, it should not, since considerations of importance in criminal prosecutions are quite different from
those of importance in administering a Medicaid program. Under the
circumstances, it is absurd to assume that regulations were passed
which would restrict a criminal prosecutor solely to use data in the
possession of the State Medicaid Agency. This interpretation of the
ambiguous language must be rejected and a reasonable alternate
sought. As for New Mexico, if its Medicaid Agency is restricted in its
access to PSRO information, and if the Medicaid Agency is simply
one of many information conduits to the Unit, as is logical, then
separate and more complete access to PSRO information by the Unit
This information must be provided where a proper request has been made, but
only the PSRO has determined that the agency making the request is recognized as a fraud or abuse agency to the Secretary, that there is an ongoing
investigation in progress and that the information is relevant to a determination of fraud or abuse. The PSRO must consider all information it receives
from the requesting agency as confidential and protect it from improper disclosure.
In addition, the PSRO may on its own motion provide such agencies with data
and information as the result of the PSRO's finding that fraud or abuse has or
may have occurred.
The Regional Office of the Office of Program Integrity will assist the PSRO
where there is a question of whether the agency making the request, or the
information requested, is proper.
53. In a January, 1979, telephone discussion with the Director of the Dallas Office of
Project Integrity, HEW, this writer asked concerning the status of the "draft." Although no
specific citation was available, this writer was advised that the "draft" had gone into effect
as a formalized Action Transmittal.
54. Letter from Michael J.Goran, M.D., supra note 51.
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is not only feasible, but is absolutely necessary to guarantee the
diligent pursuit of investigations of criminal cases.
CONCLUSION
Medicaid Fraud Control Units face interesting problems in their
pursuit of medical information needed for full-fledged provider fraud
investigations. Not only do restrictive information disclosure statutes
and policies exist in some states, but Units also face stiff opposition
from the medical profession by virtue of its incursions into heretofore sacrosanct areas of privilege.
As the analysis of this article shows, the New Mexico Unit should
find itself in the enviable position of having to encounter virtually no
legal barriers in its acquisition of desired medical information. New
Mexico has no statutory physician-patient privilege, and only one law
of dubious legal validity which might restrict access to committee
reports and deliberations. A review of the federal law as related to
the Unit discloses that the intent of the Act, as manifested by implementing regulations and guidelines, is to provide Units with total
access to all information which is in the possession of PSRO's and
which might be relevant to its fraud investigations.

